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 Abstract 
 
This paper investigates to what extent and why the key action 1 of the Erasmus+ programme, 
namely learning mobility of individuals, can be considered a soft power’s instrument on European 
Neighbourhood countries. The core assumption is that due to people-to-people contact, Erasmus 
participants are most likely to become EU informal ambassadors, in the sense that they become 
carriers of EU soft power leading to changes in cultural and social perceptions.  
However, what will the place of Erasmus+ be in the ongoing debate on international cultural 
relations’ strategy? Erasmus+ can play a major role in this new strategy considering the huge growth 
of mobility flows between EU and ENP countries, since the new programme was launched. Moreover, 
EU institutions are looking for new strategic tools of public diplomacy. Have they realised that the 
external dimension of Erasmus+ lends itself to being one of these?  
Therefore, the topic of this work is of high interest because it is closely related to the debate 
about both the means and the ends of the EU external policy. 
For the sake of this research, three case studies, from different geographical regions neighbouring the 
EU, have been chosen: Tunisia, Ukraine and Georgia.  
A comparison among these three countries will reveal under which conditions Erasmus+ can 
be considered a soft power’s instrument. Hence, the identification of conditions applicable to all EU 
partner countries in order to evaluate whether the EU can spread its soft power through Erasmus+, 
represent the thesis’s added value which opens new avenues for further research on the topic. 
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Introduction 
This year the Erasmus Programme is celebrating its 30th anniversary. This programme has become 
more challenging at every step. In fact, since 2014 Erasmus+ has been available for countries 
participating at the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The rationale behind this political choice 
is that the involvement of ENP countries in EU programmes is a means to promote reform and 
innovation in the EU’s neighbourhood. Also, it is a means to support administrative and regulatory 
convergence of partner countries with the EU. Therefore, the causal explanation is that the EU is 
aware of the importance of higher education (HE) as a tool of soft power.1  
The Erasmus programme, through the so-called ‘Erasmus effect’,2 has significantly 
contributed to EU member states’ socialisation over thirty years. Hence, the main assumption is that 
it could have the same effect on ENP countries. The ENP countries are the six Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) countries of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan plus the ten 
southern Mediterranean countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, Palestine and Israel.  
However, the study does not aim to give a comprehensive assessment of the whole Erasmus+ 
Programme on all ENP countries. The objective is to analyse the impact of the Erasmus+ key action 
1 (i.e. learning mobility of individuals) and of the former programme Erasmus Mundus on the 
countries of Tunisia, Ukraine and Georgia. The main research question is why and to what extent the 
Erasmus+ Programme is an instrument of EU soft power on European neighbourhood countries. The 
aim is to measure the impact of the EU’s mobility programmes towards cultural and geographical 
                                                 
I wish to thank my thesis supervisor, Professor Wolfgang Wessels, for comments and suggestions during the research 
period. I would like to thank Brice Cristoforetti for his constant availability and his advice on the research design of my 
surveys. I am grateful to all the experts that I interviewed who helped me in framing my thesis and in developing the main 
ideas. A special thank goes also to the Erasmus+ national offices that helped me in spreading the surveys, and to all my 
surveys’ respondents, especially the ENP alumni and students of the College of Europe 
.  
1 E. M. Botonero, ‘EU Higher Education as Soft Power in Neighbouring Countries: A Projection of Influence by 
Compelling Means’, ECPR General Conference Sciences Po Bordeaux, 2013, pp. 1-28. 
2 See for example: E. Sigalas, Cross-border mobility and European identity: The effectiveness of intergroup contact during 
the ERASMUS year abroad, European Union Politics 11(2), 2010; Mitchell, Rethinking the ‘Erasmus Effect’ on European 
Identity, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies v53 n2, 2015, pp. 330-348. 
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different ENP countries. The hypothesis of the study is that, due to socialisation through people-to-
people (P2P) contact, Erasmus participants are most likely to become EU informal ambassadors. In 
fact, they become carriers of EU soft power in ENP countries leading to changes in cultural and social 
perception. However, the differences among the three case studies reveal under which conditions 
Erasmus+ can be considered a tool of EU soft power. 
With respect to the structure of this paper, section 1 will emphasise the theoretical and 
methodological framework of the research and the research design concerning the surveys that have 
been conducted. Section 2 will describe the contextual background from the origin of the Erasmus 
programme to the current Erasmus+, as well as the brain drain/circulation phenomena. Section 3 will 
assess the EU HE cooperation programmes towards Ukraine, Tunisia and Georgia and present the 
surveys’ outcomes. Section 4 will analyse the potential and limits of Erasmus+ and will attempt to 
theorise the external dimension of the programme. Finally, the conclusion will present final 
considerations and provide policy recommendations for both the Erasmus+ and ENI regulations’ mid-
term review and the upcoming Erasmus+ Programme 2021-2027, as well as the EU strategy for 
international cultural relations.  
 
1.Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
The concept of soft power was introduced by Joseph Nye as the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than through coercion.3 This concept has been sometimes associated with the idea of 
public diplomacy (PD). The latter can be defined as “how a nation’s government or society engages 
with external audiences in ways that improve these foreign publics’ perception of that nation”4. It is 
important to highlight at this stage that the European External Action Service (EEAS) is looking to 
differentiate the new narrative of EU PD from the concept of soft power as conceptualised by Nye. 
                                                 
3 J. Nye, Soft power: the means to success in world politics, New York: Public Affairs, 2004; 
4 M. K. Cross, Conceptualizing European public diplomacy, Palgrave, 2013, cited in H. Zichner et all., European 
Neighbourhood Policy: Geopolitics Between Integration and Security, 2016, p. 166.  
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In fact, in future, the EU may wish to move away from a unilateral understanding of soft power as 
theorised by Nye, preferring a new approach based on the exchanges of points of views or mutual 
attraction. 
The concept of social and cultural perception refers to what people think about the EU from 
both a cultural and a social point of view, while the idea of P2P contact refers to mobility between 
both EU and ENP nationals and ENP nationals themselves. As far as this work is concerned, Erasmus 
activities are considered P2P contacts.   
The Erasmus effect is the impact that the Erasmus experience has on participants and their 
countries. For the purposes of this study, Erasmus participants are all ENP nationals that are or have 
been studying/training in a EU country through an EU mobility programme. Also, EU citizens who 
participated in one of these programmes in an ENP country are considered Erasmus participants.  
1.1 The EU Soft Power and Public Diplomacy  
According to Nye, the soft power of a country can be enhanced by increasing international 
student and cultural exchange programmes. Based on Nye’s concept, many scholars have highlighted 
the reliance of the EU on soft power tools to influence international affairs.5 Even though some 
authors have already written about the soft power of education,6 there has been little research 
concerning the role of EU’s educational policies as a source of soft power in ENP countries. 
Nonetheless, Zichner and Saran have written about the power of attraction of the EU’s education 
policy abroad, and they state that “it represents a resource for creating ‘soft power’; this is important 
to convince people of the attractiveness of a political offer”.7 
                                                 
5 See for example: T. Casey, Of Power and Plenty? Europe, Soft Power, and Genteel Stagnation, Comparative European 
Politics, 4(4), 2006, pp. 399-422; P. Colson, Soft Power Discourse and the Significance of European Union Foreign Policy 
Methods in L. Finn ed., The EU as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor, European Union Centre of Excellence, Nova 
Scotia, 2009. 
6 See for example: W.Y.W. Lo, Soft power, university rankings and knowledge production: distinction between hegemony 
and self-determination in higher education, Comparative Education, 47(2), 2011, pp. 209-222; J. Nye, Soft Power and 
Higher Education, Harvard University, 2005; W. Jones, European Union Soft Power: Cultural Diplomacy & Higher 
Education in Southeast Asia, Silpakorn University International Journal, 9-10, 2010, pp. 41-70. 
7 H. Zichner and V. Saran, The EU’s Education Policy Abroad: The ‘Power of Attraction’ and the Case of Moldova in 
Bruns et all., European Neighbourhood Policy: Geopolitics Between Integration and Security, 2016, p. 163. 
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Moreover, one of the priorities of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) launched in June 2016 is 
enhancing EU PD as a new narrative for the EU foreign policy. Before analysing it, one should try to 
answer the question of what PD means for the EU institutions. It means building trust and 
understanding in non-EU countries according to the following definition adopted by the EEAS:   
Public diplomacy refers to the process whereby a country seeks to build trust and understanding by 
engaging with a broader foreign public beyond the governmental relations that, customarily, have been 
the focus of diplomatic effort.8 
 
Cull distinguishes five elements of PD: ‘listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy, exchange 
diplomacy and international broadcasting’.9 This work will dwell on three of these elements: cultural 
diplomacy, advocacy and exchange diplomacy.   
Cultural diplomacy is “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through 
making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural 
transmission abroad”.10 As will be shown later in this paper, Cull’s definition fits quite well the aim 
of the key action two and Jean Monnet activities of the Erasmus+ programme. However, the term of 
cultural diplomacy “is increasingly used as a synonym for international cultural relations”.11 
For Cull, “exchange diplomacy is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment 
by sending its citizens overseas and reciprocally accepting citizens from overseas for a period of study 
and/or acculturation”.12 In his analysis, Cull observes that past experiences, for example the Franco-
German rapprochement after WW2, are based on the element of reciprocity in which both parties 
benefit. However, Cull also highlights that exchange diplomacy could be conceptualised as a one-
way process, according to which “my students will go overseas and tell you how wonderful my 
country is; your students will come here and learn how wonderful my country is”.13  
                                                 
8 European Parliament Preparatory Action, Culture in European External Relations, 2014, p. 136. 
9 N.J.Cull, Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, ANNALS, AAPSS, 616, March 2008, p. 32. 
10 Ibid., p. 33.  
11 Culture in European External Relations, op. cit., p. 134. 
12 N.J.Cull, op. cit., p. 33. 
13 N.J.Cull, loc. cit. 
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1.2 Methodological Framework and research design  
It is not easy to find relevant data for ENP Erasmus participants; the main existing findings 
stress on the economic and employability benefit of the programme, but they provide little evidence 
on the social and cultural impact. Conducting surveys, therefore, was necessary. Survey data from 
students participating in mobility exchanges (to and from ENP countries) were collected to have some 
preliminary insights. In addition, quantitative data analysis was based on complementary data sources 
from the European Commission’s and UNESCO’s websites.  
Erasmus participants were recruited via Erasmus+ national offices, which agreed to forward 
standardised emails and post the surveys on their websites. However, the Erasmus participants 
included were primarily ENP alumni and students of the College of Europe, as the ENP scholarships 
were granted at the beginning by the European Commission under the Jean Monnet programme that 
is now part of Erasmus+. From one perspective, this could be regarded as a limitation of the surveys 
conducted, since someone might argue that these individuals are more likely to have been attached to 
the EU. However, it is also possible to argue that the individuals surveyed were the most suitable for 
the aim of this paper, as they are expected to be the most aware of the EU functions and processes 
and are, thus, in a better position to provide reliable replies which could lead to insightful results.  
The outcomes of the first general survey were by and large as expected, and the replies were 
used to test them with more precise questions in the second one. Moreover, as the questions used in 
the second survey come from the Eurobarometer, it was possible to conduct a comparative analysis 
between the results. For instance, it was possible to check whether EU values according to Ukrainian 
respondents (my survey) are the same according to EU citizens (Eurobarometer survey).  
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2. Contextual background and Erasmus+ international dimension’s budget 
The external dimension of the Erasmus+ programme derives especially from the heritage of Tempus 
and Erasmus Mundus. The latter was launched in 2004 and had three actions. The first one called 
Erasmus Mundus Joint Programme (EMJP), the second Erasmus Mundus Partnership (EMP) and the 
third, promotion projects. Figure 1 gives an idea of the umbrella characteristic that put an end to the 
fragmentation of the extra-EU programmes merging them with intra-EU programmes.  
Figure 1: From Erasmus to Erasmus+ 
 
Source: European Commission14  
Concerning the current Erasmus+ international dimension’s budget, it is important to highlight 
that the most part of it is dedicated to the European neighbours. In fact, these funds come from the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and reflect the EU foreign policy’s priorities.  
                                                 
14 European Commission, Work together with European higher education institutions, Luxembourg: Publications Office 
of the European Union, 2015, p. 7. 
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Figure 2: Budget allocated for the international dimension of Erasmus+ 
 
Source: European Commission15 
As shown in Figure 2, the Southern dimension of the ENP is where more funds are allocated 
(20%), while 15% is allocated to the EaP countries. 2% is allocated for Tunisia because of the high-
level commitment, or Tunisia window, that will be explained in section 4. In total, 37% is located for 
ENP countries, whose percentage is significant if compared to the 9% for Russia. Also, it is worth 
underlining that the EU only has a complementary and supporting competence16 and not an exclusive 
one in the field of education. This represents a big limit for the EU capability in this area.  
2.1 Brain drain vs brain circulation  
When dealing with mobility programmes, one of the main concerns is the brain drain issue. 
For the EU PD, this phenomenon is really negative for two reasons. The first one is a matter of image. 
In fact, ENP countries could see these programmes, just as a way for the EU to steal their best brains.  
The second reason is that, if most ENP Erasmus alumni remain within the EU, no soft power 
can be exercised on these countries. However, a recent study (not yet published) carried out by the 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) on the impact of 
                                                 
15 Data presented during the UniMed week conference, Brussels, 29 March 2017. 
16 European Union, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), art. 6. 
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the EU support to HE in ENP countries through the previous programmes (e.g. Tempus, Alfa and 
Erasmus Mundus) shows that EU support is not producing brain drain.17 In fact, only 14% of Erasmus 
alumni took their first job outside their home country, with a slight tendency to move back home in 
the long-term.18 
The regulation establishing Erasmus+ makes clear that promoting brain circulation and EU’s 
attractiveness are the main objectives of the external dimension of Erasmus+.19 That is why major 
changes will be in force starting from mid-2018: 
• students and researchers will be allowed to work during their mobility;  
• at the end of the mobility, participants will be allowed to remain in an EU country for 
up to nine months;  
• participants’ family members will be allowed to come to Europe; and  
• ENP nationals will be allowed to move around Europe without applying for a visa by 
just notifying the country to which they are moving.20   
 
3.Assessing HE cooperation programmes towards Ukraine, Tunisia and Georgia  
Ukraine is the ENP country with the highest number of mobility exchanges with the EU due to the 
size and geographic proximity of the country.   
Table 1 shows that Ukraine is the first among the EaP countries between 2004 and 2013 for 
the number of participants to Erasmus Mundus under actions 1 and 2. The grand total for Ukraine is 
1.830 participants over ten years. Table 2 shows the figures of the first two calls of Erasmus+ that 
awarded 4.524 participants (planned mobility flows). In just two years, the number of participants 
more than doubled compared to the first ten years, a growth of 147%.  
                                                 
17 Informal discussion with EU policy officer, UniMed week conference, loc. cit.   
18 Ibid.  
19 European Parliament and the Council, Regulation No 232/2014 of 11 March 2014 establishing a European 
Neighbourhood Instrument, Official Journal of the European Union, L 77, 15 March 2014. 
20 European Commission, Visa rules being reviewed, making it easier for students to come to Europe, 22 March 2017, 
retrieved 14 April 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/updates/20170322-visa-rules-reviewed_en 
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Table 1: Erasmus Mundus combined mobility for EaP countries under Actions 1 & 2 
Country Action 1 Action 2 Total 
Armenia 83 644 727 
Azerbaijan 24 644 668 
Belarus 69 829 898 
Georgia 79 838 917 
Moldova 67 775 842 
 
 
Ukraine  373 1.457 1.830 
TOTAL 695 5.187 5.882 
Source: European Commission – DG EAC 
 
Table 2: Erasmus+ mobility planned with EaP countries for 2015 & 2016 calls combined  
Country Total participants Incoming (to EU) Outgoing (from EU) 
Armenia 1.013 746 267 
Azerbaijan 888 618 270 
Belarus 770 566 204 
Georgia 2.449 1.686 763 
Moldova 827 601 226 
Ukraine 4.524 3.456 1.068 
TOTAL 10.741 7.673 2.798 
Source: European Commission – DG EAC 
Also, UNESCO’s figures on tertiary-level student mobility flows (table 3) reveal that most 
Ukrainian students prefer coming to the EU than to other regions of the world. Moreover, even if the 
first destination country for Ukrainian students is Russia, eight out of the first ten countries are EU 
member states. Of around 45.000 Ukrainian students abroad, almost 12.000 are studying in Russia. 
The number of students in the EU is more than double (around 28.000 students), with Poland and 
Germany as the most popular destinations.  
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Table 3: Ukraine tertiary-level student mobility flows          
Destination country Number of Ukrainian students 
Russia Federation 12.043 
Poland 9.485 
Germany 5.850 
Czechia 2.098 
Italy 2.063 
United States 1.509 
France 1.131 
Austria 1.099 
United Kingdom 1.035 
Hungary 913  
Source: adopted from UNESCO Institute for statistics21  
As highlighted in Table 2, Georgia is the second largest EaP country for the number of student 
mobility flows within Erasmus Mundus22 and now Erasmus+. With 2.449 grants (1.686 outgoing to 
Europe and 763 incoming from Europe), Georgia is one of the most popular countries for credit 
mobility, ranked 8th among 131 EU partner countries. In relative numbers, Georgia can be defined 
as the most enthusiastic country about the EU mobility schemes, with 2.603 Erasmus participants 
since 2004 which correspond to almost 66% of Georgian students currently studying in Europe, and 
more than twice the number of Georgian students currently studying in Russia.  
Table 4 shows the number of Tunisian participants in Erasmus Mundus. 642 Tunisians have 
benefited from mobility activities since 2004 to 2013, under the actions 1 and 2 of Erasmus Mundus.23 
This figure is disappointing, considering that the importance of contacts between peoples has been 
stressed for a long-time in the region. In fact, the concept of P2P contacts was introduced in the 
MENA region, even earlier the launch of the ENP. The social, cultural and human affairs pillar was 
one of the three pillars of the Euro-Med partnership that aimed to promote “understanding between 
                                                 
21 Retrieved 25 March 2017, http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow 
22 European Commission, From Erasmus Mundus...to Erasmus+ Eastern Partnership Countries, Facts and Figures, May 
2014, retrieved 6 April 2017, http://www.ema.eu/fileadmin/content/News_item/EaP_E__facts_and_Figures.pdf  
23 European Commission, From Erasmus Mundus…to Erasmus+, Southern Mediterranean Countries Facts and Figures, 
June 2014. 
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cultures and exchanges between civil societies”.24 This declaration recognised “the importance of 
encouraging contacts and exchanges between young people”.25  
Table 4: Erasmus Mundus Combined mobility for Southern Mediterranean nationals Action 1 & Action 2 
Country Action 1 Action 2 Total 
Algeria 67 612 679 
Egypt 239 115 1000 
Israel 117 462 579 
Jordan 31 412 443 
Lebanon 50 476 526 
Libya 2 56 58 
Morocco 77 642 719 
Palestine 29 359 388 
Syria 47 319 366 
Tunisia 101 541 642 
TOTAL 760 4.640 5.400 
 
Source: European Commission26 
As shown in Table 4, Tunisia is only the fourth country after Egypt, Morocco and Algeria for 
the number of mobility flows. This means that not enough has been done to promote P2P activities 
in that country. That is why in 2011, the Commission recalled that:  
Exchanges at university level are valuable, and fuller use should be made of Erasmus Mundus, Euromed 
Youth and Tempus to increase substantially the number of persons from Southern Mediterranean partner 
countries participating in these programmes.27 
 
Figure 3 shows that, in the first year of mobility exchanges under Erasmus+, 639 people 
benefited from Erasmus grants from or to Tunisia, practically the same number of participants that 
Erasmus Mundus could mobilise over ten years. Consequently “Tunisia has been nominated as the 
focal point of the Erasmus+ Programme for the next years in the Neighbourhood South region”.28 
 
 
                                                 
24 Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona declaration, 28 November 1995.  
25 Ibid.  
26 From Erasmus Mundus to Erasmus+, Southern Mediterranean Countries Facts and Figures, op. cit., p. 14. 
27 European Commission, Partnership for democracy and prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, COM(2011) 200 
final, 8 mars 2011.  
28 Euro-Med Youth IV, final publication, 2016, p. 46, retrieved 27 March 2017, http://www.euromedyouth.net/IMG/pdf/ 
euromed_youth_iv_-_final_publication.pdf 
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Figure 3: Erasmus+ HE in South Mediterranean countries 2015 
 
In the composition of mobility flows, the percentage of staff moving is almost the same as 
that of students. 77% of participants come to the EU, while only 23% are EU nationals going to the 
South Mediterranean. Finally, Tunisia is still not the first country for the number of mobility 
exchanges in the region, but it is expected to become the first one soon.  
 
Table 5: Mobility planned for 2015 & 2016 Erasmus+ calls combined  
Country Total participants Incoming (to EU) Outgoing (from EU) 
Algeria 822 677 145 
Egypt 1.463 1.091 372 
Israel 3.835 2.425 1.410 
Jordan 1.190 829 361 
Lebanon 1.022 773 249 
Libya 32 32  
Morocco 2.480 1.830 677 
Palestine 828 635 193 
Syria 86 86  
Tunisia 1.316 1.035 281 
TOTAL 13.074 9.386 3.688 
Source: European Commission – DG EAC 
As shown in Table 5, under the first two years of Erasmus+, 1.316 grants were planned for 
Tunisia, more than the double that the whole preceding period 2004 - 2013. This is also a direct effect 
of the 2015 ENP review in which it was foreseen that “the EU will significantly step up the scope for 
engagement of neighbourhood partners in Erasmus+, including a higher level of funding”.29  
                                                 
29 European Commission, Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN (2015) 50 final, Brussels, 18 November 
2015, p. 9. 
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However, when summing up the number of mobility flows under Erasmus Mundus and 
Erasmus+, the result is 1.677 participants so far. Consequently, even though, over the last two years, 
the growth of participation has been remarkable, the overall figure is too small, especially if one 
compares with Georgia where the participants have been almost the double, although Georgia’s 
population is one-third the size of Tunisia’s. Therefore, as shown later in this work, the small number 
of mobility flows in Tunisia so far, does not leave room to talk about a consistent spreading of EU 
soft power through Erasmus+ in this country.  
3.1 Results of the surveys  
Regarding the first survey, 204 people representing all 16 countries taking part in the ENP 
participated. The results are in line with the outcomes of a 2013 Erasmus impact study:30 “in all 
regions, Erasmus students as well as alumni feel significantly more related to Europe than non-
mobiles”.31 Moreover, “more than 80% feel that their European attitude has been strengthened by 
mobility and this perception is especially strong in Southern and Eastern Europe (each 85%)”.32  
Nevertheless, the Erasmus impact study was addressed only to EU citizens as at that time 
Erasmus was still an intra-EU mobility programme. From my survey, this perception is even stronger 
among Erasmus participants coming from Southern and Eastern European neighbours. In fact, 92% 
of respondents feel closer to the EU’s values after the Erasmus experience (Q3).   
Regarding the data analysis, the first set of four questions aims to assess the EU soft power 
through the indicators of the EU’s attractiveness, EU affiliation and EU preferences. To this end, each 
question starts with the following formula: After studying/training in an EU country, in order to 
measure the impact that the experience in the EU had on the respondents. Not surprisingly, more than 
90% strongly agree or tend to agree that they are now more interested in some topics such as national 
                                                 
30 European Commission, ‘The Erasmus Impact Study: Regional Analysis’, 2013, retrieved 28 March 2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/repository/education/library/study/2016/erasmus-impact_en.pdf 
31 Ibid., p. 3. 
32 Ibid.  
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and European identity, multiculturalism and European cultures, EU perspectives and policies (Q2). 
Moreover, they feel closer to the EU's fundamental values, such as human rights, gender equality, 
democracy, freedom of expression and the rule of law, and they are more open to cultural and 
linguistic diversity (Q3). Finally, they would like their country to deepen its relations with the EU 
(Q4). Only the question about membership to the EU (Q5) did not reach 90% but was 81%. This is 
understandable, taking into account the sensitivity of the question.  
The second set of questions aims to assess the changes in cultural and social perceptions that 
the Erasmus participants experienced. These changes were measured through the following 
indicators: tolerance, respect for other cultures and development of intercultural skills. Each question 
starts with the formula, thanks to my experience abroad, in order to measure the causal relationship 
between the Erasmus experience and the changes. Also for this set of questions, more than 90% 
strongly agree or tend to agree with the statements formulated. In particular, thanks to the experience 
abroad, they can tolerate the behaviour and values of other individuals better without compromising 
their own values (Q6). Also, they feel more comfortable if confronted with different values and other 
people's way of life (Q7). They feel more tolerant and respectful of other cultures (Q8). Moreover, 
they learned how to interact with people of different nations and became more open to cultural issues 
and foreign humour (Q9). Finally, they have a more positive social and cultural perception of other 
people with backgrounds different from theirs (Q10).  
The survey’s results outline a broad consensus on two key issues. First, ENP nationals feel 
more attracted by the EU after the Erasmus experience. Second, the mobility experience had a positive 
impact on the perception of others. De facto, the 2013 Erasmus impact study’s results are corroborated 
with higher scores among ENP nationals. To investigate these phenomena in depth, a second survey, 
only addressed to my case studies’ nationals (Ukrainians, Georgians and Tunisians), was set up.  
15 
 
The first question of the second survey was taken from the standard Eurobarometer 85 on 
public opinion in the European Union.33 It aims to double-check how much Erasmus participants 
from Tunisia, Ukraine and Georgia are interested in European political matters. Indeed, the objective 
is to test the high score of the first survey through a more precise question.  
 
Table 6: (Q1) How often would you say you discuss about EU politics? 
Country Frequently Occasionally Never 
Tunisia 23.53% 76.47% 0% 
Georgia 45.95% 48.65% 5.41% 
Ukraine 18.42% 68.42% 13.16% 
 
The first survey showed that, around 90% of ENP Erasmus participants, feel more interested 
in EU politics. As shown in Table 6, this trend is confirmed in the second survey on the case studies’ 
nationals. In fact, they all talk about EU politics frequently or occasionally. Georgian stand out with 
the higher score. Table 7 compares these results with the 2016 annual surveys on EU perceptions in 
my case studies.  
  
                                                 
33 Standard Eurobarometer 85 – Spring 2016 - Public opinion in the European Union, retrieved 28 March 2017,  
file:///C:/Users/Andrea/Downloads/eb85_anx_en%20(1).pdf 
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Table 7:  Comparing how often Erasmus participants and public opinion talk about the EU.    
Country Frequently Occasionally Never 
Tunisian Erasmus 23.53% 76.47% 0% 
Tunisian public opinion 7% 10% 74% 
Georgian Erasmus 45.95% 48.65% 5.41% 
Georgian public opinion 7% 37% 57% 
Ukrainian Erasmus 18.42% 68.42% 13.16% 
Ukrainian public opinion 8% 28% 65% 
 
Concerning Ukraine, the 2016 annual survey on Ukrainian public opinion’s perceptions of the 
EU, aske, “How often do you look for/access information on EU?”.34 Just 8% stated “frequently” and 
65% “never”. The difference is huge when comparing these results with my survey. Indeed, 18% of 
Ukrainian Erasmus alumni assert that they frequently discuss about EU politics, 68% occasionally 
and only 13% never. The same consideration applies for Georgia. In the annual survey of the EU 
Neighbours east platform35 on Georgian public opinion, only 7% of respondents look frequently for 
information on the EU and 57% never. In my survey, the results are the other way around, with 46% 
and 5%, respectively. Regarding Tunisia, data from the opinion pool of the Southern Mediterranean 
countries report36 show that 74% of Tunisians never look for information on the EU, while all 
Tunisian participants in my survey discuss frequently (24%) or occasionally (76%) EU politics.  
This evidence is enough to assume that Erasmus participants are likely to become EU informal 
ambassadors for the simple reason that they speak more about the EU than their fellow nationals do. 
                                                 
34 European Commission, Annual Survey 2016 – Ukraine, 8 December 2016, retrieved 25 April 2017, 
http://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/publications/annual-survey-2016-ukraine-factsheets 
35 European Commission, Annual Survey 2016 – Georgia, 8 December 2016, retrieved 28 March 2017, 
http://www.euneighbours.eu/en/east/stay-informed/publications/annual-survey-2016-georgia-factsheets 
36 European Commission, ‘Factsheet Tunisia – Opinion Poll Southern Countries Report (Spring 2016)’, retrieved 28 
March 2017, http://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2017-01/Factsheet%20Tunisia%20-%20 
Opinion%20Poll%20Southern%20Countries%20Report%20%28Spring%202016%29.pdf  
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In the second question, I asked about their three most important personal values. This question, taken 
from the standard Eurobarometer 84,37 aims to assess the eventual difference between the most 
important values for my case studies’ Erasmus participants and EU nationals. Table 8 shows that 
peace is always present among the three most important values for Ukrainian, Tunisian and Georgian 
Erasmus alumni, while for EU citizens, peace is only the sixth most important value.38 Indeed, most 
Europeans surveyed did not experience war, and for them, it is a value given by default. This is not 
the case for Ukrainians, Tunisians and Georgians. The other values are almost the same, namely rule 
of law and human rights.  
 
Table 8: (Q2) three most important values personally 
 EU28 Tunisia Georgia Ukraine 
1     The Rule of law  Human rights Human rights Peace 
2 Respect for HRs The rule of law Peace The rule of law 
3      Human rights Peace Individual freedom Democracy 
 
The fourth question, also from the standard Eurobarometer 84,39 aims to measure their EU 
affiliation. As shown in Table 9, ENP Erasmus participants feel even more attached to the EU than 
EU citizens themselves. In other words, Europeans appreciate the EU less that non-Europeans. This 
phenomenon deserves deeper research that is out of the scope of this work. Indeed, it would be 
interesting to compare ENP Erasmus feelings with EU Erasmus feelings and feelings of the public 
opinion from Ukraine, Tunisia and Georgia. However, as far as this work is concerned, the main 
                                                 
37 Standard Eurobarometer 84 – Autumn 2015 –Public opinion in the European Union, p. 211, retrieved 28 March 2017, 
file:///C:/Users/Andrea/Downloads/eb84_anx_en.pdf 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., p. 176. 
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finding is that the rate of EU affiliation among ENP Erasmus is high and this makes them carriers of 
EU soft power. 
Table 9: (Q4) how attached you feel to the EU. 
Countries Very 
attached 
Fairly 
attached 
Not very 
attached 
Not at all 
attached 
Don’t 
know 
EU28 11% 38% 34% 15% 2% 
Tunisians Erasmus   25% 56.25% 12.5% 6.25% 0% 
Georgians Erasmus   27.27% 51.51% 15,15% 6.06% 0% 
Ukrainians Erasmus   38.89% 47.22% 8.33% 2.78% 2.78% 
The fifth question is not taken from any Eurobarometer. In fact, the rationale behind it is not 
to compare the results with EU nationals’ opinions, but to see how far the mobility experience has 
influenced ENP Erasmus participants regarding their European host. In my first survey, 81% of 
respondents want his/her country to join the EU. In my second survey, the question has been 
reformulated in order to have a less personalised answer. Table 10 summarises the answers.  
Table 10: (Q5) how likely is that your country join the EU one day? 
Country Most likely Likely Not likely Impossible 
Tunisia 18.75% 12.5% 18.75% 50% 
Ukraine 16.67% 41.67% 36.11% 5.56% 
Georgia 24.24% 51.52% 24.24% 0% 
 
Concerning Tunisia, 50% of respondents think that it is impossible that their country will join 
the EU and around 19% that it is not likely. Regarding Ukraine, almost 60% assert that Ukraine will 
join the EU. However, the most interesting outcome is in regards to Georgia. Almost 75% of Georgian 
Erasmus participants are persuaded that Georgia is going to join the EU, and nobody states that it is 
impossible. It shows that Georgian Erasmus participants are the most in favour of a European choice. 
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This is very interesting when comparing Georgia with Tunisia and Ukraine. The last two countries 
are much closer to the EU’s borders than Georgia. Ukraine even has common land borders with four 
EU member states (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania) and Tunisia is just a few kilometres 
from Italy, but it is Georgia, located in the Caucasian region between Turkey and Russia, that seems 
to be the most attracted by the EU. This Georgian enthusiasm is confirmed by the 2016 annual survey 
report of the Eastern partnership countries, in which is stated that “Georgia is the country that is the 
most positively-oriented towards the EU”.40  
 
4. Potential and limits of Erasmus+ in Ukraine, Georgia and Tunisia 
From the Erasmus+ early results’ evaluation and from the position papers of important stakeholders, 
some initial findings about the international dimension of Erasmus+ can be already highlighted. 
Firstly, incoming and outgoing mobility flows are not always balanced, and the budget is too low to 
respond adequately in certain regions (i.e. MENA). The latter is a problem concerning the whole 
programme in both intra and extra-EU dimensions. In fact, there is gap between the political priorities 
and economic means. Consequently, the Erasmus+ budget represents just the 1% of the EU 
multiannual financial framework (MFF). This seems too little for one of the most important and 
successful programmes of European integration’s history that is considered a political priority also in 
EU external relations.  
Summing up, the first two years of Erasmus+ brought about three principal positive 
developments regarding its external dimension: the increase in the number of planned mobility flows 
compared to the previous programming period; the involvement of less traditional European countries 
                                                 
40 European Commission. ‘Annual survey report of the Eastern partnership countries’, 2016, p.12, retrieved 28 March 
2017, http://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2017-02/EU%20Neighbours%20East_Full.report_ 
6.pdf 
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in the region (i.e. northern countries); and the visible impact on some partner countries’ universities 
through the creation or the strengthening of international relations offices.  
4.1 Georgia & Ukraine  
It is important to highlight that the EaP cooperation is more structured than the southern 
dimension of the ENP. A clear example is the Eastern Partnership Youth Window, which aims to 
promote active citizenship among young nationals of EaP countries. It is part of the EU for Youth 
programme that includes a young European neighbours network. The latter was launched in June 
2016 to foster the cooperation between young people and youth organisations within the EU and its 
Eastern Neighbours.41 It includes a young European ambassadors’ initiative wherein participants “to 
exchange experience(s), discuss matters of direct concern to young people, share best practice and 
work together for a better future”.42  
The idea of European ambassadors is strictly related to the new concept of EU PD. As a matter 
of fact, the 2015 Riga declaration43 has strengthened the platform four of the EaP dedicated to 
contacts between people. Consequently, all the aforementioned activities are the direct effect of this 
reinforcement reflecting the core objectives of the 2014-2017 platform four’s work programme.44  
Indeed, the new Eastern Partnership Youth Window is one of these activities directly financed 
by Erasmus+ under the key action two (capacity building). It will be possible to measure the impact 
of these initiatives recently launched only in the coming years. To date, they prove how the EU 
believes that investments in young European ambassadors can spread its PD.  
                                                 
41 European Commission, Youth info pack, loc. cit. 
42 Ibid.  
43 EEAS, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, 21-22 May 2015, retrieved 5 April 2017, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/docs/riga-declaration-220515-final_en.pdf.  
44 European Commission, Eastern Partnership, Platform 4 ‘Contacts between People’, Core objectives and Work 
programme 2014-2017, 15 January 2014, retrieved 5 April 2017, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/eastern/platforms/ 
docs/work_programme_2014_2017_platform4_en.pdf 
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Moreover, the recent achievements in the field of visa liberalisation will foster the mobility 
between Georgia45 and Ukraine46 and the 26 countries of the Schengen area. In fact, these initiatives 
represent the premises for an increase of contacts and socialisation between peoples. Indeed, the 
Erasmus programme has a higher potential in the EaP than in the Southern Mediterranean countries. 
First, because it is easier to deal with six countries rather than with ten. Second, because EaP countries 
are in the EHEA and this stimulates European universities to cooperate with them. Third, because of 
the size of the countries. In fact, apart from Ukraine and Belarus, the EaP countries are medium/small-
size countries where Erasmus’s funds can make the difference. Fourth, because there is less 
differentiation. In fact, the Youth window is open to all EaP countries, while in the MENA region, as 
shown later, a youth window is open just for Tunisia. The same happens with the association to the 
Horizon 2020 programme and to the key action 2 (i.e. capacity building) of the Erasmus+ programme. 
In order to explore potential and limits of Erasmus+, it is necessary to narrow the analysis on my two 
case studies from the EaP. Regarding Georgia, the high number of Georgian respondents in the first 
survey (almost 30%) has been an incentive to deep the analysis on this country. Indeed, from a 
superficial investigation, one can easily realise that the number of Erasmus exchanges in proportion 
with the population is huge. Especially when comparing Georgia and Ukraine, which are the two EaP 
countries having the most important number of students coming to the EU under Erasmus+. 
Respectively 1.686 and 3.456 mobility flows planned. The same proportion is respected in the data 
of students and staffs coming to Europe from 2004 to 2014 under Erasmus Mundus.47 This means 
that the number of Erasmus participants in Ukraine is a little more than the double of Erasmus 
participants in Georgia. Nevertheless, Ukrainian population (45.2 million) is ten times the size of the 
Georgian population (4.4 million). Moreover, the age structure of the population is similar. In fact, 
                                                 
45 EEAS, Visa Free Travel comes into effect for Georgia, 29 March 2017, retrieved 5 April 2017, https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
delegations/georgia/23697/visa-free-travel-comes-effect-georgia_en 
46 European Conseil, Visas: Council confirms agreement on visa liberalisation for Ukrainians, 2 March 2017, retrieved 5 
April 2017, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/02-visa-liberalisation-ukraine/ 
47 European Commission, Erasmus – Facts, Figures & Trends, The European Union support for student and staff 
exchanges and university cooperation in 2013-2014, loc. cit. 
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the age group from 15 to 29, which is the greatest beneficiary of the Erasmus actions, represents 
20.2% of the population in Georgia48 and 18.2% in Ukraine.49 Therefore, on a weighted average, the 
Erasmus+ programme has an impact on Georgian population much higher than on Ukrainians. As a 
measure of that, the ratio of the Erasmus participants over the total population of the country is 
provided for both Georgia and Ukraine. The results show that for Georgians the possibilities to benefit 
from Erasmus grants is much higher in proportion to the whole national population. For this reason, 
when it comes to EU soft power, Erasmus+ has an enormous potential in Georgia while in Ukraine, 
it is limited by the high number of inhabitants.  
4.2 Tunisia 
Tunisia has a privileged status under Erasmus+. In fact, among the South Mediterranean 
countries, it is the only one that can participate in the key action 2 (i.e. capacity building). Moreover, 
EU and Tunisia recently launched a Youth partnership, called Tunisia window. This makes Tunisia 
the only ENP country to have a dedicated entry in the international dimension budget of Erasmus+. 
This entry amounts to 2% of the total budget on top of the 20% already foreseen for the ENP South 
dimension. In short, ten million more for Tunisians distributed as following: three for HE cooperation 
and capacity building, six for learning mobility and one for youth organisations. The European 
Commission is passing to Tunisian universities the following messages. First, to work with non-
traditional partners in Europe. That is to say, with Nordic countries, like Ireland or Netherlands and 
also with Eastern Europe countries. Second, to be involved in the drafting of the application by the 
European universities and to negotiate carefully their inter-institutional agreements. Third, to benefit 
from the specific Tunisia window in general.50 This shows the EU’s commitment to invest in Tunisian 
young people.  
                                                 
48 Population pryramid.net, Georgia, retrieved 27 April 2017, https://www.populationpyramid.net/georgia/2017/ 
49 Population pryramid.net, Ukraine, retrieved 27 April 2017, https://www.populationpyramid.net/ukraine/2016/ 
50 Informal discussion with EU policy officer, UniMed week conference, loc. cit. 
23 
 
Concerning the learning mobility of individuals, under the first two years of Erasmus+, ‘9.386 
grants were provided to students and teachers from southern Mediterranean countries, who came to 
study, receive training or teach in Europe’.51 Among them, 1.035 Tunisians (planned figures) went 
to the EU between 2015 and 2016 thanks to Erasmus+ and around 800 participated to Erasmus 
Mundus from 2004 to 2014. Comparing with Ukrainian and Georgian figures, Tunisia is, among my 
case studies, the country with less participants ever. But, like Georgia for the EaP, Tunisia is the first 
among the North African countries when considering the Erasmus participants’ ratio over the total 
national population. Indeed, Tunisia has 12 million of inhabitants, Morocco 35 million, Algeria 40 
million and Egypt 91 million, while Libyans have not been granted so far. Erasmus+ ‘also funded 
3.688 Europeans in the opposite direction’.52 Moreover, the EU ‘hopes to finance the mobility needs 
of at least 3,000 Tunisians over the period 2015-2020’.53 This will be salutary for a country, like 
Tunisia, that has a young profile with a median age of 30.5 years. For this reason, the programmes of 
HE cooperation can be efficient in Tunisia because of the high level of school life expectancy 
(primary to tertiary education) around 15 years. Therefore, many students reach the level of education 
in which they can beneficiate from EU mobility programmes. However, Erasmus’s potential in 
Tunisia has been limited so far by the low number of grants.    
4.3 Theorising the Erasmus+ Programme  
Figure 4 shows that PD aims to enhance EU’s values and interests among non-EU students 
through P2P activities. So, if someone was wondering why EU awards grants to ENP nationals to 
study at the College of Europe, the answer is that it is a matter of PD. In fact, these grants were 
                                                 
51 European Commission, Erasmus+: An important link for the modernisation of university education in Tunisia, EU 
Neighbours south, retrieved 20 March 2017, http://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/default/files/Features/2017-02/ 
Erasmus%2B%20Tunisia%20EN.pdf 
52 European Commission, Erasmus - Facts, Figures & Trends, op. cit.  
53 Ibid.  
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distributed in the past through the Jean Monnet action, that ‘aims to support the College of Europe as 
it is an institution pursuing an aim of European interest’.54  
Figure 4: Partnership instrument’s infographic  
 
Source: European External Action Service’s website55  
 
The Jean Monnet action is a clear tool of EU PD. Indeed, this action, is part of Erasmus+ since 
2014, as noted above. The main goal of Jean Monnet activities is ‘to increase knowledge about 
European integration in strategic countries by promoting teaching, research and debate’.56 This 
proves that Erasmus+ is financing activities considered EU PD that are supposed to increase EU soft 
power. Moreover, the same fiche refers to Erasmus+ and underlines that one of the objectives is to 
enhance cooperation in HE through the promotion of students and academic staff mobility.57 The 
                                                 
54 European Parliament and the Council, Regulation establishing 'Erasmus+': The Union programme for education, 
training, youth and sport, Official Journal of the European Union, L347, 20 December 2013, p. 59. 
55 European External Action Service’s website, retrieved 20 April 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/ 
20160620_fpi_publicdiplomacy_infographic_web.pdf 
56 European Commission, Action Fiche for Public Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 3. 
57 Ibid.  
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aforementioned fiche is part of the implementation of the PI.58 The latter has four main objectives 
and one of these is to promote EU PD. The PI ‘can fund activities in any non-EU country, with an 
emphasis on partner countries of strategic interest to the EU’.59 That is exactly the case of ENP 
countries.   
It is worth underlining that Zichner and Saran, writing about the impact of Erasmus Mundus 
in Moldova, have already highlighted that “recalling the layer of identity politics inherent in the 
Erasmus programme, one can look at it through a similar lens, namely that of cultural or public 
diplomacy”.60 In fact, spreading EU PD has been one of the main goals of the ENP since the 2015 
review as “better communicating and promoting EU policies will be at the heart of the new ENP”.61 
What is more, “improved public diplomacy will contribute to better explaining the rationale of EU 
policies and the positive impact of concrete EU actions”.62 In addition, in the same communication, 
it is clearly underlined that “the EU should engage more on this public diplomacy agenda with 
governments, civil society, the business community, academia and other citizens in partner countries, 
in particular youth”.63 Moreover, the European Commission64 makes explicit reference to the 
Erasmus Mundus programme as the best example of “inter-cultural exchanges of students, researchers 
and alumni”.65  
Furthermore, it asserts that “the Commission will support the establishment of Erasmus+ 
alumni groups in partner countries and cooperation between these groups and EU delegation”.66 Also, 
the European Parliament is working on an own-initiative about a new strategy to put culture at the 
                                                 
58 European Commission, Service for foreign policy instrument, retrieved 14 April 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/what-
we-do/partnership_instrument_en.htm 
59 European Commission, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Towards an EU strategy for 
international cultural relations, Brussels, JOIN (2016) 29 final, 8 June 2016.  
60 H. Zichner and V. Saran, op. cit., p. 166.  
61 JOIN (2015) 50 final, op. cit., p.20. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid., p. 21. 
64 JOIN (2016) 29 final, loc. cit.  
65 Ibid., p. 14. 
66 JOIN (2016) 29 final, loc. cit. 
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heart of EU international relations.67 In the Committees’ draft report, the MEPs ask “the Commission 
to strengthen the international dimension of Erasmus”.68    
As a result of all these considerations, it seems that the EU considers the external dimension 
of Erasmus+ a tool of PD. For this reason, even if this work focuses mainly on the key action one (i.e. 
learning mobility of individuals), it was interesting to combine all Erasmus+ key actions with the 
PD’s elements according to Cull’s theory. This exercise illustrates that the key actions of Erasmus+, 
as implemented in the extra-EU mobility, meet some elements of PD. 
Table 13: Comparison between Erasmus+ Key Actions and Public Diplomacy’s elements 
Erasmus+ Key Actions Public Diplomacy’s elements 
Learning mobility of individuals One-way exchange diplomacy 
Capacity building Cultural diplomacy 
Policy reform Advocacy/ Cultural diplomacy 
Jean Monnet Cultural diplomacy/ One-way exchange diplomacy 
 
To date, key action one (extra-EU mobility of individuals) can be considered a one-way 
exchange diplomacy rather than an exchange diplomacy tout court. This happens for two reasons. 
The first one is the imbalance between mobility flows, with around 75% of ENP nationals coming to 
the EU and only 25% of EU nationals going in ENP countries. The second reason is the composition 
of EU participants. In fact, they are mostly staff (professors, academics). This means that it is not 
possible to talk about a peer education’s phenomenon; instead, it can be better considered as a passage 
of knowledge’s phenomenon (how to do things) from EU staff to ENP nationals.   
                                                 
67 European Parliament, Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, Own-initiative procedure, 
2016/2240(INI). 
68 European Parliament, Draft Report on Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, 2016/2240(INI), 
Brussels, 22 March 2017, p. 8. 
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Key action two (i.e. capacity building) is an example of cultural diplomacy. In fact, capacity 
building means exchange of good practices, and it fits very well the notion of cultural diplomacy in 
the sense of exchange of cultural ways of life.  
Finally, Erasmus+, through the policy reform’s action, aims to support and facilitate “the 
modernisation of education and training systems, as well as support for the development of European 
youth policy, through (…) the structured dialogue with young people”.69 According to Cull, the PD’s 
element of advocacy:  
is an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by undertaking an international 
communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s general interests in 
the minds of a foreign public.70 
 
It therefore seems that the key action three of Erasmus+ can be considered an example of advocacy 
or, at least, of cultural diplomacy, while the Jean Monnet action aims to make known the EU 
achievements overseas, making it a clear example of cultural diplomacy. However, when it 
subsidises, the mobility of non-EU nationals (like at the College of Europe in the past), it can be 
considered a one-way exchange diplomacy as well. 
 
5. Conclusion 
My survey results prove that Erasmus+ leads to changes in social and cultural perceptions 
independently of being a tool of EU soft power. In order for Erasmus+ to be also an instrument of 
soft power, the three following conditions must be satisfied:  
1. Avoiding brain drain and promoting brain circulation. The EU must encourage people 
coming to Europe, thanks to Erasmus+, to go back to their countries and help the development 
                                                 
69 European Parliament and the Council, Regulation establishing 'Erasmus+': the Union programme for education, 
training, youth and sport, op. cit., p. 56.  
70 N.J.Cull, Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, loc. cit. 
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over there. Otherwise, the personal Erasmus experience cannot have an impact on the alumni’s 
home country or region.  
2. Small country with limited population in which the EU funds can make the difference. This 
condition excludes Ukraine from being considered a fertile ground to exercise EU soft power 
through Erasmus+.  
3. A high level of mobility flows in both directions (to and from the EU). In fact, EU nationals 
going to ENP countries reach people that are outside the range of Erasmus+ targets. In other 
words, they meet and socialise with people who are not likely to participate in mobility 
exchanges because of age, social or economic obstacles. This condition excludes Tunisia from 
being considered a fertile ground to exercise soft power through Erasmus+. In fact, as shown 
in Section 4, the number of mobility flows has not been high. Moreover, the balance of 
participants’ origin is too heavily in favour of Tunisia. Just one participant out of four is a 
European going to Tunisia. In short, there are too few EU nationals going to Tunisia in order 
to reach enough Tunisian people outside the range of Erasmus+ targets. The last consideration 
applies to Ukraine as well. In this case, even fewer than one participant out of four is 
European. Finally, in Georgia, the figures show that more than one participant out of three is 
a EU citizen. So, once again, Georgia meets the condition to be considered a fertile ground to 
exercise EU soft power through Erasmus+. 
Table 14 applies the three conditions stemming from my case studies. Consequently, my 
hypothesis is not supported for Tunisia and Ukraine. However, there is a significant difference 
between these two countries. 
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Table 14: Conditions under which consider Erasmus+ a tool of EU soft power 
Soft power Conditions Georgia Tunisia Ukraine 
Avoiding brain drain & 
promoting brain circulation    
Small country with limited 
population    
High level of mobility flows 
from and to the EU    
 
Tunisia does not fulfil just the condition related to the level of mobility flows and their 
direction. This means that an increase of funds would be enough to fulfil all conditions. Ukraine also 
does not fulfil the territorial and demographic conditions. This means that the EU budget’s efforts 
would be too onerous to reach substantial numbers of Ukrainians through Erasmus+. In addition, 
Russia, as shown in Section 3, has a greater influence on Ukrainian students’ mobility, while this is 
not the case for Georgia and Tunisia.          
In conclusion, the answer to my research question is that Erasmus+ is a tool of EU soft power 
because EU institutions believe it is a means to clinch the European choice of ENP countries. This is 
proved to the extent that my hypothesis is supported in the Georgian case study. However, in the light 
of my research, and of the ongoing debate on the EU PD and international cultural relations’ strategy, 
a consistency between the external dimension of Erasmus+ and the concept of PD has been 
highlighted. Hence, future research should take this into account. To this end, an interesting 
hypothesis would be that Erasmus+ is a PD’s tool rather than directly a soft power’s one, but useful 
to spread EU soft power. Therefore, further research on the relationship between PD and the external 
dimension of Erasmus+ in all its actions could provide valuable complementary findings. Then, it 
would be interesting to apply the conditions stemming from my research to all EU partner countries, 
even beyond the ENP countries, to assess whether they are fulfilled in other cases as well.  
30 
 
5.2 Policy recommendations 
In order to conclude this paper, in view of the aforementioned new programme for the period 
2021-2027, the mid-term review of both the Erasmus+ and the ENI regulations and the ongoing 
debate on international cultural relations’ strategy, relevant policy recommendations are listed below. 
First, it is advisable that in the next programme proposal, the European Commission defines 
the nature of the external dimension of Erasmus+. Currently, the situation is paradoxical, as mobility 
and capacity building actions are used by the European institutions in all kind of documents on PD 
and international cultural relation. However, these are not aims recognised in the Erasmus+ legal 
basis itself. In fact, in the regulation establishing Erasmus+71, there is no reference to public or 
cultural diplomacy. This could be also a way to help the EEAS in legitimising the new PD’s narrative.  
Also, many have underlined that social goals in the Erasmus+ programme are not clearly 
operationalised and EU institutions are stressing too much the employability benefit of the 
programme and not enough the social and cultural benefits. That is why, it is recommended to provide 
explanations on how more substantial intercultural understanding for the benefit of strengthened 
inter-regional co-operation, particularly between Europe and other parts of the world, can be 
achieved.  
My third recommendation would be to respect and implement the co-ownership principle of 
the ENP.  This means that ENP countries should be programme countries and not partner countries. 
In this way, they would share the same rights and duties foreseen by the Erasmus+ regulation for 
programme countries. This would also encourage EU stakeholders (i.e. universities) to boost the 
number of exchanges with these countries, as they will have the same responsibilities. Moreover, this 
possibility is already foreseen in the regulation establishing Erasmus+ in article 2472. With a full 
                                                 
71 European Parliament and the Council, Regulation establishing 'Erasmus+': the Union programme for education, 
training, youth and sport, loc. cit.  
72 Regulation establishing 'Erasmus+', loc. cit. 
31 
 
implementation of this provision, ENP countries would have a national agency rather than a small 
Erasmus+ office. Therefore, it is crucial for the interest of both EU and ENP countries to implement 
article 24.   
The fourth recommendation would be to balance the mobility flows. In other words, it is 
important to encourage more Europeans to cross the EU’s borders and spend some time working or 
studying in a ENP country in order to fully implement the ENP co-ownership principle. Mobility 
should not be just unidirectional (from ENP countries to EU) but also bidirectional, from EU to ENP 
countries. Already in view of the 2015 ENP review, some stakeholders have asked the European 
Commission to “allow for better reciprocity in the exchanges between EU and neighbourhood 
countries”.73 Therefore, the “EU should stimulate and support measures for promoting outgoing 
mobility to institutions in neighbourhood countries”,74 for instance, “by supporting universities and 
thus providing incentives for developing and enhancing mobility towards the ENP partners”.75 This 
is also important, as noted above, to reach people that are outside the range of Erasmus+ targets. 
The fifth recommendation is to promote a South-South mobility scheme, as the main problem 
of the Mediterranean region is that it is the less-integrated region in the world. That is why the EU 
should promote an intra-MENA academic mobility scheme, following the example of the intra-Africa 
Academic mobility programme.  The latter is a kind of Erasmus among African countries. In fact, it 
“grants scholarships to students (at masters and doctoral level) and to university staff members 
(academic and administrative) to carry out studies, research, teaching, and training assignments in 
another African country”.76 Similarly, the European Commission should enhance labour market 
                                                 
73 European Universities Sssociation, The role of universities in the European Neighbourhood Policy, EUA’s response to 
the public consultation, “Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, 2015. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid.  
76 European Commission, Intra-Africa Academic mobility scheme leaflet, retrieved 2 April 2017 
http://www.erasmusplus.tn/uploads/FCK_files/IntraAfrica_Leaflet_A4_100x210_EN_PRINT(1).pdf 
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orientation given that in 2050 Africa’s population is set to double,77 making Africa the most populated 
continent.  
Another valuable recommendation is that, Commissioner Navracsics should join the European 
Commission’s project team “Europe in the world” which is the cluster of Commissioners dealing 
with EU external policy and led by the High Representative Federica Mogherini. In fact, regarding 
the role of Erasmus+ in the EU strategy on international cultural relations, Erasmus+ should become 
a pillar of this strategy. Other EU actors also think so: some MEPs believe that Erasmus “would be 
the single most efficient instrument of EU international cultural relations if it could be enhanced 
through much increased funding and staff, notably for the youth exchange program with third 
countries”.78 
Finally, if the EU wants to build a “European Neighbourhood Erasmus generation” that can 
make the difference in shaping political decisions in ENP countries close to the EU preferences, the 
EU must foresee more funds and finance more mobility exchanges. In Europe, the Erasmus scheme 
achieved amazing results over the last thirty years. This means that it is not something that can happen 
in few months. It is a long-term process that can lead to important and valuable results only step-by-
step.  
 
                                                 
77 Population Reference Bureau (PRB), 2016 World Population Data Sheet, retrieved 24 Avril 2017, 
http://www.prb.org/Publications/DataSheets/2016/2016-world-population-data-sheet.aspx 
78 MEPs Jordi Solé, Igor Šoltes, Helga Trüpel, Amendments Tabled in committee, Amendment 233, 4 April 2017, p. 107.  
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